In the field of human judgement and decision making there are on-going tensions between different perspectives and models relating to rational reasoning and optimising versus simplifying through the use of heuristics and satisficing. This distinction is often linked to differentiating between System 1 (e.g., intuitive, associative, reflexive) and System 2 (e.g., deliberate, analytic, reflective) modes of thinking and reasoning. In addition, heuristics as simplifying rules (‘shortcuts’) have been associated with reduced accuracy and as giving rise to cognitive biases and errors (cf. Kahneman & Tversky — the biases & heuristics framework), though another view approaches heuristics more favourably and in some situations advantageous (cf. Gigerenzer — the fast-and-frugal framework). This area of research is evolving and shaping all the time, open to new and fresh views and approaches.
In an article for Behavioral Economics website, Guy Hochman (professor of behavioural science) offers his view of a ‘modified’ reasoning human species: “Homobiasos: The Species that Rationalizes with Eyes Wide Shut” (BehavioralEconomics.com – The BE Hub, 7 April 2026). The homobiasos stands in a middle-ground between homo economicus and homo heuristicus, representing aspects of the two latter species while combining between them and adding some newer aspects.
The homobiasos is primarily notable for his inclination of “weaving stories to make our decisions appear reasonable, moral and coherent“. Sometimes stories are generated, without being grounded in reality, for maintaining consistency (e.g., with prior beliefs, other information), in craving for meaning, or for feeling good about our actions (i.e., morally or ethically). Hochman suggests that the homobiasos “rationalizes with eyes wide shut” in the sense of perceiving and using information selectively, interpreting it through “comforting filters”. Thus, the homobiasos could find or invent ‘rational’ reasons after a decision is made; the implication would be that “we make decisions, then justify them”.
Hochman lays down some key concepts to portray traits, cognitive and behavioural tendencies of the homobiasos. Coherence is raised as a strong motivator of reasoning. Integration of information (i.e., utilising and comparing multiple cues) may be performed even in intuitive thinking or reasoning, where a bias may be allowed if it achieves greater coherence (not out of laziness). Hochman, it should be said, does not abide to common conventions about separation between intuitive and deliberate modes of thinking on the basis of processes that are supposedly associated with or unique to each mode of thinking (see elaboration below). In his view, there is a flaw in the assumption that analytic thinkers make less errors while intuitive thinkers are prone to be biased; in his research he challenges these kinds of generalisations.
Another important motivator Hochman puts forward is self-protection. It may arise, for example, from (1) ethical dissonance whereby people alter perception rather than their behaviour (e.g., minor cheating to gain some profit without feeling corrupt, lying justified by altruistic reasons, for instance, to present an action as legitimate); (2) selective blindness due to motivated ignorance of uncomfortable information or for avoiding threatening information as a coping mechanism (e.g., an uncomfortable truth that might threaten one’s sense of competence, avoid uncertainty — both may imply admission of vulnerability).
- Consumers are likely to resort to selective blindness when making financial decisions (e.g., loans, insurance, investments) as well as decisions about technological-digital products and services (e.g., more complex domains, more difficult to comprehend details or nuances, may involve admission of various limitations of one’s resources). Exposure to AI triggers in humans, according to Hochman, anxiety in anticipation of change and self-annihilation anxiety; the relation is U-shaped — moderate engagement with AI mitigates anxiety whereas avoidance or overexposure heighten the anxiety.
Excuses or justifications we make up are intended not necessarily for others but for ourselves. Justifications may serve us effectively in reducing psychological tensions when our values conflict with our actions. Ignorance applied as a moral justification for avoiding uncomfortable truths can help us maintain self-worth. Hochman suggests that coherence is preferred by people to accuracy, and self-respect comes before insight. He notes in summary on this matter: “The refusal to know is itself a bias — one that feels perfectly rational and ‘correct’ from the inside“.
Storytelling as part of reasoning is a prime concept promoted by Hochman. In his view, “integrative, story-driven reasoning lies at the heart of Homobiasos“. Hochman explicates this contention in an eloquent and concise manner: “We are not mahcines that process information; we are storytellers aligning facts with our preferred self-image.”
The approach Hochman developed to biases is intriguing and seems less conventional. Biases, from his perspective, may function as aids for humans to maintain self-coherence, a form of “meaning management”. In particular he suggests: “Biases are not simply errors based on gut feelings; they are emotional compromises between truth and identity”. Rationalisation, biases and stories are means for “keeping us whole amid a complex and contradictory reality”. The lesson for us, as members of the homobiasos species, is to use reason with understanding of its function, not to despair of it, yet also be aware of the pitfalls that may come along the way. For example, realise when stories comfort rather than clarify and be ready to open our eyes to additional and valid information. This is not a matter of irrationality, stupidity or bad morals, but a part of the nature of humanity. Hence, the homobiasos may not be “purely rational’, Hochman advises, but he or she can at least aim to be more “honestly biased“.
The perspective of Hochman is closer to the one advanced by Gigerenzer rather than Tversky and Kahneman’s in holding a more positive and less critical stand towards heuristics (i.e., fast-and-frugal). That is, he sees more potential of benefits in applying heuristics as simplifying decision rules, which may not necessarily require in certain situations or problems to sacrifice accuracy. Yet Hochman has also raised reservations in recognition of limitations with the framework of fast-and-frugal rules. In particular, he distinguishes between the ability of heuristics to predict decision outcomes and the ability to reliably describe decision processes (this applies to decision rules more generally).
Overall, however, Hochman’s perspective is broader, and somewhat more complicated. Reasoning is an interactive process, first in shifting between different types of decision rules and strategies, second wherein System 1 and System 2 operate in parallel and may overlap with respect to the decision rules being used. The lines Hochman draws between System 1 and System 2 seem to be much less sharp than can be found elsewhere in literature. He is confirming the parallel or analogy between intuitive / deliberative thinking processes and compensatory / non-compensatory processes. Accordingly, rational reasoning can occur by intuition, and sequencing of processes is less rigid (e.g., deviating from nicely structured two-stage processes, such as analytic System 2 kicks-in after System 1 or non-compensatory decision rules followed by compensatory rules). Hochman proposes that intuitive vs. deliberate characteristics represent between-system processes (i.e., they distinguish between System 1 and System 2) whereas compensatory vs. non-compensatory principles pertain to within-system processes (i.e., they may operate within each of the systems). [Beyond the Surface: A New Perspective on Dual System Theories in Decision-Making, Guy Hochman 2024, Behavioral Science 14 (11), available for reading online at MDPI.]
Hochman introduces a compelling conception of the human species Homobiasos. The portrayal of cognitive (thinking) patterns and behavioural tendencies of the homobiasos involves forms of reasoning applied, biases, stories, motivations, and decision processes. Their implications for behaviour of the homobiasos (that is, us) are explained. This route set out by Hochman looks interesting and promising, which can open a wider spectrum for our understanding of human decision-making in real life and guiding future research in this field. His portrayal of Homobiasos for Behavioral Economics is in itself a good story.
